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The current study examined the malleability of implicit attitudes using the Im-
plicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). In Experiment 1, “similar” and 
“opposite” were presented as response options with the sample terms “old peo-
ple” and “young people” and various positive and negative target stimuli. Re-
sults showed significantly faster response latencies for consistent (e.g., Similar-
Positive-Young People) compared to inconsistent tasks (e.g., Similar-Positive-Old 
People). Explicit measures did not correlate with this IRAP effect. Experiment 2 
determined whether prior exposure to pictures of admired and disliked old and 
young individuals had an impact on IRAP performance. Results revealed that 
pro-old exemplars reduced the pro-young IRAP effect, but reversed the anti-old 
effect, and this held for 24 h; explicit measures were largely unaffected. The 
findings suggest that the IRAP provides an informative measure of attitude-
change following pro- versus anti-exemplar training.
Keywords: implicit attitudes, transformation of function, multiple exemplars, 
implicit cognition, relational frame theory, adult humans 
The study of implicit cognition has led to a recent profusion of research 
within psychology that has served to generate a range of so-called implicit 
measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998), the Go/No-go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001), 
Evaluative Priming (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), and the 
Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003). Currently, the 
most popular among these measures is the IAT, and its basic effect has 
been replicated many times (Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, & Klauer, 2005). For 
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example, the IAT has been used to assess implicit cognitions in the socially 
sensitive domains of homophobia (e.g., Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001), gender 
stereotypes (e.g., Rudman & Glick, 2001), racism (e.g., Greenwald, et al., 1998), 
religious stereotyping (e.g., Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999), 
and even self-esteem (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). 
The IAT, as an indirect measure of implicit attitudes, rests on the 
assumption that it should be easier to categorize concepts that are strongly 
associated in memory relative to concepts that are weakly associated 
(Greenwald et al., 1998). In a seminal study, Greenwald et al. (Experiment 1) 
used the IAT to test responses to four categories of items (flowers, insects, 
pleasant words, and unpleasant words). The researchers assumed that the 
concept flower and the attribute pleasant are associated in memory, as are 
the concept insect and the attribute unpleasant. Based on this assumption, 
Greenwald et al. reasoned that responses should be faster when response 
key assignment was congruent (e.g., key 1 = “flower” and “pleasant” 
vs. key 2 = “insect” and “unpleasant”), rather than incongruent (e.g., 
key 1 = “flower” and “unpleasant” vs. key 2 = “insect” and “pleasant”). As 
predicted, mean response latencies were shorter for congruent relative to 
incongruent tasks. Critically, a divergence between performance on the IAT 
and the expression of explicit attitudes has been repeatedly shown (e.g., 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; De Houwer, 2002; de Jong, 2002). For example, 
participants who alleged not to hold prejudiced attitudes responded faster 
and more accurately when categorizing White people with positive words and 
Black people with negative words, as opposed to White with negative and 
Black with positive (see Greenwald et al., 2002). 
Traditionally, research on prejudice reduction has viewed implicit attitudes 
as fixed and immutable and has therefore focused on changing explicit 
attitudes (Bargh, 1999; Devine, 1989). In the past, it was argued that prejudice 
reduction requires perceivers to be aware of their bias and be motivated to 
change it (Allport, 1954; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Myrdal, 
1944). However, a recent theme in the literature concerns the malleability of 
implicit cognitions, which are believed to be less available to introspection 
and deliberate control (see Bargh, 1999; Blair, 2002). Several recent studies 
have suggested that implicit attitudes are sensitive to (a) expectancies (Blair 
& Banaji, 1996), (b) practice or training (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & 
Russin, 2000), (c) automatic motives (Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor, 2000), and 
(d) motivation to respond without prejudice (Lepore & Brown, 1997). 
One way in which researchers have begun to study the malleability 
of implicit attitudes involves presenting participants with a series of 
exemplars that are designed to affect their attitudes toward a specific 
target (e.g., Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 
2001). In Ex periment 1 of the study reported by Dasgupta and Greenwald, 
participants were exposed to pictures of either admired Black and disliked 
White individuals, or disliked Black and admired White individuals. An IAT 
was administered directly after exemplar exposure and again 24 h later 
without reexposure to the exemplars. Explicit attitude measures were also 
administered across the two sessions. Results revealed that exposure to 
admired Black and disliked White exemplars significantly weakened implicit 
pro-White preferences for 24 h, but did not affect explicit racial attitudes. 
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 but focused on implicit age-related 
attitudes. Specifically, participants were exposed to either pro-old (i.e., 
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admired old and disliked young individuals) or pro-young (i.e., disliked old 
and admired young individuals) exemplars. Again, results revealed that 
exposure to pro-old exemplars significantly weakened implicit pro-young 
preferences, but not explicit preferences. 
Although the IAT has been used with relative success to study implicit 
attitudes and their malleability, a number of limitations inherent in the 
procedure have been identified (see De Houwer, 2002). The most important of 
these in the context of the current study is that the IAT provides a measure 
of relative associative strength and cannot be used to measure the valence 
of individual concepts (De Houwer, 2002; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2004). 
For example, an IAT effect for “young” versus “old” could indicate that a 
participant has a positive attitude toward “young” and a neutral attitude 
toward “old,” or it could indicate a neutral attitude toward “young” and a 
negative attitude toward “old.” In effect, the IAT can indicate that x is preferred 
to y, but it cannot reveal to what extent x and y are liked or disliked, per se. 
Critically, the relative nature of the IAT effect may serve to obfuscate 
exactly how a specific attitude-changing intervention affects the targeted 
attitude. Consider, for example, the study by Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001). 
Following pro-old and anti-young exemplar training, participants showed a 
reduced IAT effect. However, did this reduction reflect a reduction in anti-old 
attitudes, a reduction in pro-young attitudes, or some combination of both? A 
single IAT cannot answer this question.
Alternative methods for assessing implicit cognition have been developed 
that aim to assess implicit attitudes toward individual concepts. For example, 
Nosek and Banaji’s (2001) Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT) is similar 
to the IAT in the sense that it involves two separate tasks during which 
participants are required to categorize attribute and target stimuli. Unlike 
the IAT, however, participants do not have to respond to all of the stimuli on 
each trial. To assess attitudes toward fruit, for instance, participants may be 
required in one task to press a key in the presence of fruit names and positive 
words, and in a second task to press the key when presented with fruit names 
and negative words. The strength of association between fruit + good versus 
fruit + bad is thought to be reflected in more rapid responding to fruit when 
it is paired with good rather than bad. Other tasks, such as the emotional 
Stroop (Pratto & John, 1991), evaluative priming (Fazio et al., 1986), and the 
Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003), have also been 
offered as methods for assessing implicit attitudes in a nonrelative fashion 
(see Blair, 2002; De Houwer, 2003). Critically, however, each of these methods, 
along with the IAT, may be considered a relatively indirect measure of 
implicit attitudes or beliefs. That is, none of the methodologies requires that 
participants engage in a task that asks them to confirm or deny, in a direct 
way, the belief or attitude under investigation.
In noting the indirect nature of the IAT, De Houwer (2002) argued that 
[it] does not provide a measure of beliefs, nor was it designed 
to do so. It can only provide an index of associations that are 
assumed to be involved in certain beliefs and thus indirect 
evidence for the presence of certain beliefs. (pp. 117–118)
In other words, if a methodology such as the IAT indicates that “old”-
related and negative words are strongly associated, for example, it is then 
inferred that such implicit associations underlie negative beliefs about old 
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people. Although such an inference seems reasonable, it would also seem 
prudent to attempt to develop additional methodologies that aim to provide 
relatively direct measures of implicit cognition. One such methodology has 
recently been offered, the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; 
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Milne, Power, & Stewart, 2006), and, critically, 
as will be explained later, its structure may also permit a more fine-grained 
assessment of the impact of exemplar training than that afforded by the IAT. 
Unlike the IAT and other indirect measures, each trial of the IRAP 
asks participants to confirm or deny a specific belief or attitude directly, 
by responding to a relation between a sample stimulus and a target term.1  
In the first IRAP study (Barnes-Holmes, Hayden, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 
2008), participants were presented with a sample stimulus (i.e., “Pleasant” 
or “Unpleasant”), a positively or negatively valenced target stimulus (e.g., 
love or an accident), and two relational terms (i.e., similar and opposite). The 
feedback for consistent and inconsistent blocks of trials coordinated with and 
opposed, respectively, previously established verbal relations. As predicted, 
response latencies were faster for consistent than for inconsistent trials 
(e.g., participants responded more quickly to Pleasant–Love–Similar than to 
Pleasant–Vomit–Similar). This basic IRAP effect has now been replicated across 
a small number of studies, which have shown that the IRAP (a) compares well 
with the IAT as a measure of individual differences (Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, in press; Barnes-Holmes, Waldron, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Stewart, 2009), (b) is not easily faked (McKenna, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Stewart, 2007), (c) may be used as a measure of implicit self-esteem 
(Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009), and (d) produces 
effects that clearly diverge from those obtained from explicit measures when 
targeting socially sensitive attitudes (Power, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Stewart, in press).
Conceptually, the IRAP was derived from Relational Frame Theory 
(RFT), a behavior analytic account of human language and cognition (Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). According to RFT, the IRAP is a computer-
based task that requires participants to respond quickly and accurately 
in ways that are either consistent or inconsistent with their prior verbal 
learning histories. It is assumed that overt relational responses defined as 
consistent on the IRAP will be preceded by incipient or private responses 
that occur at a higher probability than those responses defined as 
inconsistent; the probability of such responses is assumed to be determined 
1 We have suggested that the directness of a measure may lie on a continuum, with the IAT 
(and its derivatives) at the indirect end, traditional questionnaires at the opposite end, and the 
IRAP located typically somewhere in the middle (Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2006). Our basic argument 
is that questionnaires are best considered highly direct measures because they ask participants 
to respond to items concerning the relevant attitude, and those responses are then assumed to 
provide a direct measure of same. In contrast, measures such as the IAT are considered indirect 
because they do not ask participants to respond to questions directly relevant to the attitude 
under study. Furthermore, differential response times are used to assess associative strength, 
which is then used to infer the strength of the relevant attitude. The IRAP appears to lie in 
between these two extremes because it involves asking participants to respond to “questions” 
directly relevant to the attitude under study, but differential response time is used to index the 
strength of that attitude. Although this interpretation of the directness of various measures 
remains open to further debate, it does seem to provide a useful way of conceptualizing the 
various methodologies.
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by historical and current contextual variables. The basic rationale behind 
the IRAP is that participants’ responding should be faster on consistent 
relative to inconsistent trials because incipient relational responding will 
coordinate more frequently with the consistent overt responding. In other 
words, during inconsistent trials, participants’ responding is expected 
to be slower, because they respond against their more probable incipient 
relational responses.2
Given our assumption that historical and current contextual variables 
determine performance on an IRAP, it seems likely that the types of 
exemplar exposure employed by Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) with the 
IAT should also affect the IRAP. Imagine, for example, that participants 
are exposed to an IRAP in which they are required to relate positive 
and negative words, such as “happy” versus “weary,” respectively, to the 
sample stimuli “young people” and “old people.” Given the historical 
context provided by the wider verbal community, prevalent in the Western 
world, faster responding on the IRAP may be predicted for responses that 
coordinate young with positive and old with negative stimuli, than vice 
versa. If, however, participants are presented with a series of exemplars of 
positive old people and negative young people, this may establish the IRAP 
experiment as a context for the transformation of functions of the sample 
stimulus “old people” from a negative to positive valence, with the opposite 
effect for the “young people” sample (i.e., from positive to negative). In short, 
in the absence of any exemplar exposure, the IRAP should produce a pro-
young/anti-old effect, but if pro-old/anti-young exemplars are presented, 
evidence for pro-old and/or anti-young responding may be observed. A 
primary purpose of the current study was to test this prediction.
As noted earlier, an important feature of the IRAP is that its structure 
may permit a more fine-grained analysis of the impact of exemplar training 
than that afforded by the IAT. More specifically, the IRAP consists of four 
trial types (see Figure 1), and this structure may allow the researcher to 
assess specific, rather than relative, changes in implicit responses. In the 
present research, each trial on the IRAP involved presenting one of two 
sample stimuli—“young people” or “old people”—and a target stimulus, 
which was either a negative stereotypical term for old people (e.g., “slow,” 
“tired,” “stagnant”) or a positive term for young people (e.g., “enthusiastic,” 
“energetic,” “creative”). The fact that the two categories (“old” and “young”) are 
presented on separate trials with just one target may permit a less relativistic 
measure of implicit responses to those categories than that provided by the 
IAT (which presents both categories on every trial during the critical test 
blocks). For example, if participants are presented with pro-old/anti-young 
exemplars before exposure to the IRAP, will the IRAP effect for both young 
and old trial types change, or will we see a change for one but not the other? 
The current research addressed this issue.
The IRAP is relatively new and it has not been used to examine age-
related bias. Thus, Experiment 1 was designed to determine if an IRAP 
indeed produces a pro-young and/or anti-old bias in the absence of any 
exemplar exposure. Experiment 2 then sought to investigate the malleability 
2 We assume that responding against incipient relational responses may occur at an 
unconscious or nondeliberative level (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). This view is broadly consistent 
with recent evidence indicating that when participants are successfully motivated to reduce an IAT 
effect, it appears that they do so through unconscious processes (Boysen, Vogel, & Madon, 2006).
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of responding on the age-related IRAP using the type of exemplar training 
employed by Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001).
Similar
Energetic
Opposite
Young/Positive
Young People
InconsistentConsistent
Select ‘d’ for Select ‘k’ for
Similar
Tired
Opposite
Young/Negative
Young People
ConsistentInconsistent
Select ‘d’ for Select ‘k’ for
Similar
Enthusiastic
Opposite
Old/Positive
Old People
Inconsistent Consistent
Select ‘d’ for Select ‘k’ for
Similar
Weary
Opposite
Old/Negative
Old People
Consistent Inconsistent
Select ‘d’ for Select ‘k’ for
Figure 1. Examples of the four IRAP trial types. The sample (“young people” or “old 
people”), target word (energetic, tired, etc.), and response options (Similar and Opposite) 
appeared simultaneously on each trial. Arrows with superimposed text boxes indicate 
which responses were deemed consistent or inconsistent (boxes and arrows did not 
appear on-screen). Selecting the consistent response option during a consistent block, or 
the inconsistent option during an inconsistent block, cleared the screen for 400 ms before 
the next trial was presented; if the inconsistent option was chosen during a consistent 
block, or the consistent option during an inconsistent block, a red X appeared on-screen 
until the participant emitted the alternative response. 
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Five males and seven females ranging in age from 18 to 26 years (M = 21) 
completed Experiment 1. All 12 participants were Irish nationals. Ten partici-
pants were undergraduate Arts students attending various third-level Irish 
educational institutes, and two worked as hairdressers. No financial or other 
incentives, other than the knowledge that they were assisting in scientific 
research, were offered for participation in the experiment. 
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Apparatus
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure. The IRAP software presented 
stimuli and recorded participants’ responses. On each trial, one of two target 
stimuli (“old people” or “young people”) and a single positive or negative 
target stimulus were presented by the program (see Figure 1 and Table 1). Two 
response options (i.e. “similar” and “opposite”) were also presented on each 
IRAP trial. The positive and negative target stimuli were selected following 
a “brainstorming” session in which the investigators sought to generate a 
range of positive descriptors for young people and negative descriptors for 
old people. In constructing the list for old people, it was deemed important 
to identify terms that were negative but not extremely so (e.g., “tired” rather 
than “evil”), and that in principle could also apply to young people. The 
converse was true for young people, in that the terms chosen were positive 
and could in principle apply to old people.
Semantic differentials and feeling thermometers. Participants completed 12 
semantic differential scales: 6 for old people and 6 for young people. These 
7-point scales (–3 to +3) were anchored at either end by the following polar-
opposite adjective pairs (taken from the IRAP): creative–stagnant, happy–sad, 
brilliant–slow, energetic–tired, enthusiastic–weary, and productive–finished. 
Two feeling thermometers assessed the favorability of participants’ explicit 
feelings about young and old people. Participants were asked to mark an 
appropriate position on a picture of a thermometer numerically labelled at 
10º intervals from 0º (cold, or unfavorable) to 99º (warm, or favorable). Both 
the semantic differential scales and feeling thermometers were presented on 
A4-sized paper sheets.
Table 1 
The Stimulus Arrangements for All Trial-types 
Sample 1: Young People Sample 2: Old People
Response Option 1: Similar Response Option 2: Opposite
Target Stimuli Consistent with Sample 1 Target Stimuli Consistent with Sample 2
Happy 
Energetic
Productive
Brilliant
Creative
Enthusiastic
Sad
Tired
Finished
Slow
Stagnant
Weary
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two phases. Phase 1 involved exposure to 
the IRAP; six participants each were randomly assigned to one of two IRAP 
conditions (described subsequently). In Phase 2 participants completed the 
semantic differential scales and feeling thermometers. Each participant 
completed the experiment on an individual basis, in a quiet room, with the 
door closed. 
Implicit measure. Included in the IRAP computer program were on-
screen standardized instructions, which participants read in their own 
time, pressing the space bar to move between screens. The instructions 
described the IRAP procedure, described how to complete the task, and 
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emphasized the need for both accuracy and speed. At no point, however, 
were the participants informed which tasks were deemed to be consistent 
or inconsistent.
On each trial of the IRAP, four stimulus words appeared on-screen 
simultaneously. Specifically, for each trial a sample stimulus, either “old 
people” or “young people,” appeared at the top-center position of the 
screen with a single target word (e.g., enthusiastic) that appeared in the 
mid-center of the screen. The two relational terms similar and opposite 
appeared at the bottom left- and right-hand corners. The phrases “PRESS 
‘d’ FOR” and “PRESS ‘k’ FOR” appeared directly above the two relational 
terms. The relational terms alternated position randomly from left to right 
across trials. 
Participants were required to choose one of the two relational terms by 
pressing the appropriate response key when presented with a sample and target 
stimulus; all other computer keys were disabled. Choosing the relational term 
that was deemed “correct” for that particular block of trials removed all stimuli 
from the screen for a 400-ms interval before the next trial was presented. 
Choosing the relational term that was deemed “incorrect” for that particular 
block of trials produced a red “X” mid-screen directly below the target 
stimulus. The IRAP program only proceeded to the 400-ms interval (and the 
next trial) when the “correct” relational term was selected. 
The IRAP comprised eight blocks of 24 trials. Specifically, two practice 
blocks were followed by six test blocks. Within each block, the two sample 
stimuli (“old people” and “young people”) were presented randomly across 
trials, with the constraint that each was presented 12 times within a 24-trial 
block. The 12 target stimuli were also presented in a random sequence, with 
the added constraint that each term was presented twice, once in the presence 
of each sample stimulus.
Two IRAP sequences were employed in the experiment. Six participants 
were exposed to consistent relations first, and the remaining six were exposed 
to inconsistent relations first. The first block of trials for those in the former 
sequence reinforced responses that were deemed relationally consistent with 
a pro-young/anti-old bias (hereafter referred to as “pro-young”). For example, 
when presented with the sample “young people” and any of the positive target 
words, choosing the relational term similar was deemed correct and progressed 
the IRAP program to the next trial. If the relational term opposite was chosen, 
this was deemed incorrect and the red “X” appeared. The same feedback 
contingencies were applied to the other three trial-types: “young people” – Negative 
Target – Opposite = Correct / Similar = Incorrect; “old people” – Positive Target – 
Similar = Incorrect / Opposite = Correct; “old people” – Negative Target – Similar 
= Correct / Opposite = Incorrect. The second block of trials in the consistent-
relations-first sequence reinforced responses that were deemed relationally 
inconsistent with a pro-young bias (i.e., each of the feedback contingencies 
described above was reversed; see Figure 1). Following the first two practice 
blocks, six test blocks were presented in a sequence that alternated between 
consistent and inconsistent blocks. The same procedures applied in the 
inconsistent-relations-first sequence, except that the blocks alternated from 
inconsistent to consistent across both the practice and test blocks. 
Before each block of trials, a message appeared on-screen informing the 
participant that the following block was either a practice or a test. In the latter 
case, the message also stated, “Go fast—a few errors are okay.” Following each 
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block of trials, feedback was presented on-screen detailing the percentage 
of correct responses and the median response latency for that block. In 
addition, a message informed participants that all of the previously correct 
and wrong answers would be reversed in the next block. Upon completion of 
all eight blocks, a message appeared asking the participant to report to the 
researcher.
Explicit measures. Participants completed the six semantic differential 
scales for old people and the other six for young people. The participants also 
completed the two feeling thermometers. Participants then reported to the 
experimenter, who thanked and debriefed them. 
Results and Discussion
Data Preparation
The primary datum from the IRAP was response latency, defined as the 
time in milliseconds that elapsed between the onset of the trial and a correct 
response made by the participant. For the purposes of the current study, 
the Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) C4 algorithm was applied to the 
data from the six test blocks. Specifically, latencies below 300 ms and above 
3,000 ms were recoded as 300 ms and 3,000 ms, respectively; latencies on 
error trials were included in the analysis. 
Implicit Measure 
The overall mean latencies calculated across participants for each of the 
test blocks for consistent and inconsistent trials are presented in Table 2. 
Each of the test blocks produced shorter latencies for consistent relative to 
inconsistent trials. Test blocks 2 and 3 produced shorter latencies relative 
to test block 1, in both consistent and inconsistent conditions, suggesting a 
standard practice effect.
Table 2 
Overall Mean Response Latencies (in Milliseconds) and Standard Errors in Each 
Test Block for Consistent and Inconsistent Trials, Separated According to IRAP 
Sequence; Consistent First Versus Inconsistent First
Consistent Inconsistent
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE
Con 1st
Incon 1st
1,909
1,539
128
80
1,787
1,496
51
67
1,774
1,521
53
137
2,069
1,733
168
124
1,985
1,580
167
103
1,930
1,639
146
84
Preliminary statistical analyses were conducted to test for possible order 
and sequence effects and to determine if there was an interaction between 
or among these two variables and the critical IRAP condition (i.e., consistent 
vs. inconsistent trials). The adjusted mean latencies for each participant 
were subjected to a 2 × 2 × 3 mixed repeated measures ANOVA, with IRAP 
conditions and test sequence (Test 1, 2, or 3) as repeated measures and order 
(consistent-first vs. inconsistent-first) as the between-participants variable. 
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The main effect for the IRAP condition was significant, F(1, 10) = 6.51, p = .03, 
η
p
2 = .39,3 as was the effect for order, F(1, 10) = 5.85, p = .04, η
p
2 = .37. The 
main effect for test sequence was nonsignificant, as were the four interaction 
effects (all ps > .1). The analyses indicate that participants responded faster on 
IRAP trials that involved categorizing young people positively and old people 
negatively relative to trials that involved the opposite categorizations (young-
negative and old-positive; see Figure 2). The main effect for order indicates 
that participants responded more rapidly when exposed to inconsistent-first 
relative to consistent-first test blocks, but, critically, neither this variable nor 
test sequence interacted significantly with the IRAP condition. In short, the 
predicted consistent versus inconsistent IRAP effect was observed for age-
related items, and this effect was not significantly modulated by order and 
test sequence variables.
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Figure 2. Overall mean response latencies (in milliseconds), including standard error 
bars, for consistent and inconsistent test blocks. 
Explicit Measures
Semantic differential scales were scored by averaging the six items for 
old and then the six items for young to create two indices, in which higher 
scores indicated more favorable attitudes. The two feeling thermometers 
yielded an evaluative rating for each age category in which higher scores 
also represented more favorable attitudes. Participants expressed a greater 
liking for young compared with old people on semantic differential scales 
(Ms = 1.94 and –0.31; d = 1.68), and a one-way repeated measures ANOVA 
indicated that this difference was significant, F(1, 11) = 16.489, p = .002, 
η
p
2 = .6. Participants also reported slightly more favorable attitudes toward 
young compared with old people on the feeling thermometers (Ms = 66.67° 
3  The partial eta squared (η
p
2) statistic indicates the proportion of the variance (controlling 
for other variables within the experiment) that is attributable to the relevant effect. This measure 
of effect size is robust at values at or above 0.15 (Cohen, 1988).
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and 70.83°; d = .32), but the difference was not significant, F(1, 11) = 1.211, 
p = .29. 
Relationship Between Implicit and Explicit Measures
An IRAP difference score was calculated for each participant by 
subtracting the total mean response latency for consistent trials from the 
total mean latency for inconsistent trials; a positive score thus indicated a 
bias for young people. For explicit measures (both semantic differentials 
and thermometers), difference scores were computed by subtracting 
participants’ ratings of “old people” from their ratings of “young people,” 
such that higher scores indicated relative preference for young over old.
No significant correlations were found between the explicit and 
implicit measures (IRAP and feeling thermometers, r = –0.182, p = .55; 
IRAP and semantic differentials, r = –0.369, p = .22). Similarly, there were 
no significant correlations between the two explicit measures for ratings 
of either old or young people (old people, r = 0.234, p = .44; young people, 
r = 0.252, p = .4).
Summary
The IRAP showed a bias toward young people, as did the semantic 
differential scales. The IRAP thus performed like the IAT, but the semantic 
differentials produced an effect not reported by Dasgupta and Greenwald 
(2001). One likely explanation for this discrepancy is that the current semantic 
differentials presented relatively mild and more age-relevant descriptors (e.g., 
tired–energetic) compared to the IAT study, which presented such descriptors 
as ugly–beautiful, bad–good, unpleasant–pleasant, dishonest–honest, and awful–
nice. It seems likely, therefore, that the semantic differentials in the current 
study were less prone to social desirability effects (e.g., reporting that young 
people are more energetic than old people might not be seen as particularly 
prejudiced). The correlations between implicit and explicit measures were 
all weak and nonsignificant. In any case, the IRAP appears to function in a 
way that is broadly similar to the IAT. Having demonstrated that the IRAP is 
sensitive to a pro-young bias, Experiment 2 sought to replicate the Dasgupta 
and Greenwald (2001) malleability finding, but using the IRAP to assess 
the category-specific changes that might occur following pro- versus anti-
exemplar training.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants
Twenty-four participants (8 males and 16 females) ranging in age 
from 18 to 26 years (M = 19) completed the first session of the experiment 
(1 participant failed to return for a second session). Experimentally naïve 
participants were recruited using the same sample and inclusion criteria as 
in Experiment 1. Before signing up, however, participants were informed that 
the study required two half-hour sessions separated by 24 h. 
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Apparatus
The apparatus and materials employed in Experiment 1 were also 
employed in Experiment 2, but additional materials were used for the 
exemplar training (see below). 
Selection of exemplars. Pictures of 40 well-known old and young 
individuals were downloaded from the Internet using the GoogleTM search 
engine. Ten pictures featured each of the following four categories: 
(a) admired old individuals (e.g., Einstein), (b) admired young individuals 
(e.g., actress Jodie Foster), (c) disliked old individuals (e.g., Imelda Marcos), 
and (d) disliked young individuals (e.g., Timothy McVeigh). All pictures were 
converted into gray scale and standardized to 4 cm × 5 cm in dimension. Each 
picture was then centered on a single sheet of paper, and these were used to 
construct six separate booklets: two practice booklets, two test booklets, and 
two age-test booklets.
The practice booklet for the pro-old condition contained 10 pictures 
of admired old and 10 pictures of disliked young individuals. The pro-
young booklet contained 10 pictures of admired young and 10 of disliked 
old individuals. The name of each person was positioned 1 cm above the 
picture. Just below the picture were two profile descriptions placed side by 
side, one being true and the other one false. Throughout the booklet, the 
left–right positions of these true and false descriptions alternated randomly. 
An “answer box” appeared directly beneath these descriptions with the words 
A or B? printed underneath. Printed on the back of each page was the correct 
profile.
The test booklet for each condition was identical to the practice booklet, 
minus the answers on the back of each page. The two age-test booklets were 
similar to the test booklets, but there were no pictures or profiles; only the 
name of each individual and the words Old and Young were presented, with 
A or B and the answer box.
Implicit Measure
The IRAP was identical to Experiment 1.
Explicit Measures 
The six semantic differential scales and two feeling thermometers that 
were used in Experiment 1 were employed again.
Procedure
Twenty-four participants each were assigned randomly to one of two 
conditions: 12 to a pro-old/anti-young condition (hereafter referred to as 
pro-old) and 12 to a pro-young/anti-old condition (hereafter referred to as 
pro-young). In each case, 6 participants were assigned to the consistent-
relations-first sequence and 6 to the inconsistent–relations-first sequence. 
The experiment consisted of five phases: (a) exemplar exposure, (b) implicit 
measure, (c) explicit measures, (d) Implicit measure administered 24 h later, 
and (e) explicit measures administered 24 h later.
Exemplar exposure. The exemplar task was presented as a “general knowl-
edge task” assessing participants’ familiarity with famous and infamous indi-
603THE IRAP AND AGEIST ATTITUDES
Ta
b
le
 3
 
O
ve
ra
ll
 M
ea
n
 R
es
p
on
se
 L
a
te
n
ci
es
 (
in
 M
ill
is
ec
on
d
s)
 a
n
d
 S
ta
n
d
a
rd
 E
rr
or
s 
in
 E
a
ch
 T
es
t 
B
lo
ck
 f
or
 C
on
si
st
en
t 
a
n
d
 
In
co
n
si
st
en
t 
Tr
ia
ls
, 
Se
p
a
ra
te
d
 A
cc
or
d
in
g
 t
o 
IR
A
P
 S
eq
u
en
ce
, 
fo
r 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
 E
xp
os
ed
 t
o 
Pr
o
-O
ld
 a
n
d
 P
ro
-Y
ou
n
g
 
E
xe
m
p
la
rs
, 
o
n
 B
ot
h
 D
a
y 
1
 a
n
d
 D
a
y 
2
C
o
n
si
st
en
t
In
co
n
si
st
en
t
Te
st
 1
Te
st
 2
Te
st
 3
Te
st
 1
Te
st
 2
Te
st
 3
M
SE
M
SE
M
SE
M
SE
M
SE
M
SE
D
ay
 1
Pr
o
-O
ld
C
o
n
 1
st
1,
9
3
5
17
9
1,
8
9
7
15
0
1,
8
9
7
13
7
1,
9
9
4
16
0
1,
8
14
18
7
1,
8
9
8
15
8
In
co
n
 1
st
1,
9
2
5
24
2
1,
7
9
9
19
8
1,
7
9
9
13
5
1,
7
5
7
10
2
1,
6
9
8
10
5
1,
6
2
6
9
6
Pr
o
-Y
o
u
n
g
C
o
n
 1
st
2
,0
0
4
13
4
1,
8
4
3
13
0
1,
8
6
4
10
3
2
,1
3
5
17
4
2
,0
5
0
14
6
2
,0
9
2
13
1
In
co
n
 1
st
1,
91
5
9
4
1,
8
7
8
6
8
1,
8
41
5
6
2
,2
9
6
9
9
1,
9
4
6
11
8
1,
9
8
6
11
8
D
ay
 2
Pr
o
-O
ld
C
o
n
 1
st
1,
7
9
4
15
2
1,
6
6
5
15
5
1,
6
4
4
12
3
1,
7
3
7
19
4
1,
6
8
1
21
2
1,
7
9
8
14
8
In
co
n
 1
st
1,
7
0
2
16
7
1,
8
9
6
16
4
1,
6
5
4
10
6
1,
5
7
1
11
5
1,
6
0
0
9
3
1,
4
9
8
5
6
Pr
o
-Y
o
u
n
g
C
o
n
 1
st
1,
7
0
8
9
4
1,
6
6
3
10
3
1,
6
21
6
9
1,
8
0
4
12
0
1,
8
3
8
12
3
1,
8
8
2
12
9
In
co
n
 1
st
1,
6
6
8
8
3
1,
8
19
11
3
1,
6
7
8
8
1
1,
8
2
2
15
0
1,
8
9
9
16
2
1,
9
6
4
17
3
604 CULLEN ET AL.
viduals. The exemplar task was a tripartite exercise in which each participant 
was given (a) a practice booklet, (b) a test booklet, and (c) an age-test booklet, 
to be completed in that order. If fewer than 16 of the 20 participants failed 
to identify the correct profile and age (young or old) across the test and age 
booklets, participation in the experiment was terminated. Seven participants 
were removed on this basis.
Implicit measure. Participants completed an IRAP identical to that 
employed in Experiment 1, and then continued to Phase 3.
Explicit attitude measures. Participants completed the same semantic 
differentials and feeling thermometers that were employed in Experiment 1. 
Implicit and explicit measures were administered 24 h later. On Day 2, each 
participant completed the same IRAP and self-report measures again, without 
any exposure to, or reminders of, the exemplars seen during the previous day.
Results and Discussion
Implicit Measure
The IRAP latency data were transformed using the same algorithm employed 
in Experiment 1. The overall mean latencies for each of the six IRAP test blocks 
for pro-young and pro-old groups, for Days 1 and 2, are presented in Table 3. 
Exposure to pro-young exemplars produced shorter latencies for consistent relative 
to inconsistent trials, both immediately after exemplar exposure and 24 h later. 
However, pro-old exemplars reversed this effect for both IRAP exposures. 
IRAP administered immediately after exemplar exposure. Preliminary 
statistical analyses were conducted on the combined data set from the pro-
young and pro-old groups to test for a possible order effect and to determine 
if it interacted with test sequence or IRAP condition. A 2 × 2 × 3 mixed 
repeated measures ANOVA was applied to the adjusted latencies, with IRAP 
conditions (consistent vs. inconsistent) and test sequence (Tests 1, 2, and 3) 
as repeated measures and order (consistent-relations-first vs. inconsistent-
relations-first) as the between-participants variable. The main and interaction 
effects for order were each nonsignificant (ps > .49) and thus order was not 
included in subsequent analyses. The main effect for test sequence proved to 
be significant, F(2, 22) = 8.404, p = .0008, η
p
2 = .7, but it did not interact with 
any of the other variables (all ps > .42). Given the significant main effect, test 
sequence was incorporated into subsequent analyses.
Following the preliminary analyses, a 2 × 2 × 3 mixed repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted with IRAP conditions (consistent vs. inconsistent) and test 
sequence (Tests 1, 2, and 3) as repeated measures and exemplars (pro-old vs. pro-
young) as the between-participants variable. The main effect for test sequence 
was significant, F(1, 22) = 8.276, p = .009, η
p
2 = .79, as was the critical interaction 
effect for IRAP condition by exemplars, F(1, 22) = 5.823, p = .02, η
p
2 = .001. All 
remaining effects were nonsignificant (all ps > .2). The differential effects of 
exemplar training are presented in Figure 3 (panel A). The graph shows that the 
pro-young group produced longer latencies for inconsistent, relative to consistent, 
trials, but this pattern was reversed for the pro-old group. 
Given the significant interaction, two separate 2 × 3 ANOVAs were 
conducted (IRAP condition test sequence), one for pro-young and one for 
pro-old. The pro-young ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for IRAP 
condition, F(1, 11) = 10.124, p = .009, η
p
2 = .48, and for test sequence, F(2, 
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11) = 6.253, p = .007, η
p
2 = .36. Critically, however, there was no interaction 
effect (p = .37), suggesting that the sequence effect was due simply to a 
practice effect across both consistent and inconsistent trials. The ANOVA for 
the pro-old group yielded no significant effects (ps > .1). In other words, the 
pro-young exemplars appeared to produce an IRAP performance similar to 
that produced in Experiment 1 with no exemplar training, whereas the pro-
old exemplars removed the anti-old IRAP effect.
Additional analyses. Separate analyses were conducted for pro-young 
and pro-old groups to explore the effects of sample (“old people” vs. “young 
people”) and target type (positive vs. negative), and to determine if there were 
any interaction effects among these variables and the critical IRAP condition
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Figure 3. Response latencies following pro-old versus pro-young exemplars on the 
IRAP immediately after exemplar exposure (A) and 24 h later (B). Bars indicate standard 
errors.
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(see Table 4). The pro-young exemplar group produced shorter response 
latencies for consistent relative to inconsistent trials across all combinations 
of samples and targets. The pro-old group also produced shorter latencies on 
consistent relative to inconsistent trials for “young people,” but the reverse 
pattern was observed for the “old people” sample for both types of target.
Two separate 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs were conducted, one for pro-young and 
one for pro-old, with sample, target type, and IRAP condition as repeated 
measures variables. The pro-young ANOVA yielded significant main effects 
for sample, F(1, 11) = 12.919, p = .004, η
p
2 = .39; target type, F(1, 11) = 6.466, p = 
.03, η
p
2 = .37; and IRAP condition, F(1, 11) = 9.977, p = .009, η
p
2 = .48. The effect 
for sample x IRAP condition was significant, F(1, 11) = 5.542, p = .04, η
p
2 = .34, 
with the interaction for sample × target type marginally so, F(1, 11) = 4.636, 
p = .054, η
p
2 = .30. The remaining two interaction effects were nonsignificant 
(ps > .35). The critical interaction effect between sample and IRAP condition 
is presented in Figure 4 (top-left panel). The data indicate that the difference 
between consistent and inconsistent trials was greater for “young people” 
than for “old people” samples. More informally, the participants found it 
easier to respond positively to young people than to respond negatively to 
old people.
Table 4 
Overall Mean Response Latencies (in Milliseconds) Calculated Across All 
IRAP Trials, Divided in Terms of Sample, Target Type, Exemplar, and IRAP 
Condition on Both Day 1 and Day 2
Young People Old People
Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
M SE M SE M SE M SE
Day 1
Pro-Old
Positive 1,742 132 1,772 101 1,921 112 1,733 96
Negative 1,819 111 1,857 102 1,873 111 1,752 114
Pro-Young
Positive 1,746 68 1,955 68 1,981 72 2,098 108
Negative 1,880 69 2,171 100 1,992 65 2,132 96
Day 2
Pro-Old
Positive 1,573 91 1,644 109 1,713 91 1,628 99
Negative 1,688 106 1,722 91 1,713 91 1,627 99
Pro-Young
Positive 1,582 48 1,829 93 1,741 60 1,931 103
Negative 1,664 80 1,876 98 1,714 61 1,958 97
In contrast to the pro-young ANOVA, the pro-old ANOVA yielded only one 
significant effect: an interaction for sample × IRAP condition, F(1, 11) = 20.63, 
p = .0008, η
p
2 = .65. The effects of this interaction are presented in Figure 4 
(top-right panel). The data indicate that the difference between consistent 
and inconsistent trials was relatively small for the “young people” samples, 
although it was in a pro-young direction. Critically, however, the consistent–
inconsistent difference was relatively large and in the opposite direction 
for the “old people” samples. More informally, the participants did not 
show a strong preference for young people, but did show a relatively strong 
preference for old.
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In summary, therefore, the pro-young exemplars produced a strong pro-
young effect with a somewhat weaker anti-old effect. In contrast, the pro-
old exemplars produced a very weak pro-young effect, but a relatively strong 
pro-old effect. To compare exemplar training directly, difference scores were 
calculated for each participant by subtracting mean latencies for consistent 
trials from inconsistent trials for “young people” samples, and similarly 
for “old people” samples. An independent t test was used to compare the 
difference scores for pro-young versus pro-old exemplar conditions for each 
sample (setting alpha at .025 to control for Type 1 error when conducting two 
t tests). The “Old-People” sample yielded a significant effect (t = –2.6, p = .02), 
with the “Young-People” sample approaching significance (t = –1.9, p = .07). 
These analyses support the conclusion that the exemplar training had a 
stronger impact on the old- than on the young-people IRAP effect. 
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Figure 4. Response latencies following pro-old versus pro-young exemplars for “young 
people” and “old people” samples on the IRAP immediately after exemplar exposure (A) 
and 24 h later (B). Bars indicate standard errors. Con = consistent; Incon = inconsistent.
IRAP administered 24 h after exemplar exposure. The data from the Day 2 
IRAP for both groups combined were subjected to the same preliminary 
statistical analyses as were applied to the Day 1 data (to test for an order 
effect and for interactions with test sequence or IRAP condition). The ANOVA 
yielded no such main or interaction effects, and thus order was not included 
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in subsequent analyses. Although the main effect for test sequence was not 
significant, it was incorporated into subsequent analyses to maintain analytic 
consistency with Day 1, and, furthermore, the test sequence × IRAP condition 
interaction did approach significance (p = .07; all other ps > .2).
A 2 × 2 × 3 mixed repeated measures ANOVA, with IRAP condition and test 
sequence as repeated measures and exemplars as the between-participants 
variable, indicated no significant main effects (all ps > .2191). Similar to Day 1, 
however, the critical interaction effect for IRAP condition by exemplars was 
significant, F(1, 21) = 5.533, p = .03, η
p
2 = .21. All remaining interaction effects 
were nonsignificant (all ps > .09). The graphs presented in Figure 3 (panel B) 
illustrate that the general pattern of results obtained in Day 1 were also 
observed in Day 2, with an overall reduction in response latencies, probably 
due to a simple practice effect, across the 2 days. Two separate 2 × 3 ANOVAs 
were conducted (IRAP condition × test sequence), one for pro-young and one 
for pro-old. Similar to Day 1, the pro-young ANOVA yielded a significant 
effect for IRAP condition, F(1, 11) = 8.222, p = .01, η
p
2 = .43, with no interaction 
effect (p = .16). Unlike Day 1, there was no effect for test sequence (p = .36), 
supporting the conclusion that the Day 1 effect was due to practice. The 
ANOVA for the pro-old group yielded no significant effects, as was the case 
for Day 1 (all ps > .39). 
Additional analyses. The same additional analyses that were conducted for 
the Day 1 data were conducted for Day 2 (see Table 4), and the same pattern of 
results emerged. Specifically, the pro-young group produced pro-young IRAP 
effects across both combinations of samples and targets, whereas this effect 
was observed only for the “young people” sample, and was reversed for the 
“old people” sample, for the pro-old group.
Similar to Day 1, the pro-young 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA yielded a significant 
effect for the critical IRAP condition, F(1, 11) = 10.892, p = .007, η
p
2 = .50. 
Unlike Day 1, however, there was no interaction between sample and IRAP 
condition (p = .87). A comparison of the upper and lower panels of Figure 4 
for the pro-young exemplars suggests that the interaction effect disappeared 
in Day 2 because the difference between consistent and inconsistent trials for 
the “old people” sample increased in size from Day 1 to Day 2.
The ANOVA for the pro-old data yielded three significant effects: one for 
target type, F(1, 10 = 7.780, p = .02, η
p
2 = .45; an interaction for sample × target 
type, F(1, 10) = 7.780, p = .02, η
p
2 = .45; and an interaction for sample × IRAP 
condition, F(1, 10) = 8.433, p = .016, η
p
2 = .46. Neither of the former two effects 
was obtained for Day 1, but they remain relatively unimportant because they 
did not interact with the critical IRAP condition (ps > .73). Consistent with 
Day 1, the principal finding was the latter interaction effect. 
In summary, therefore, 24 h after exemplar exposure, the pro-young 
exemplars continued to produce a strong bias toward young over old people, 
with some suggestion that the bias against old people actually increased. 
The weak pro-young effect observed for the pro-old exemplar group was 
maintained across the 2 days, but the relatively strong pro-old bias seen 
in Day 1 was reduced somewhat in Day 2. To compare exemplar training 
directly for Day 2, difference scores were calculated as for Day 1. Once again, 
an independent t test revealed that the exemplars significantly affected the 
difference scores for the “old people” sample (t = –2.528, p = .02) but not for 
the “young people” sample (t = –1.680, p = .1). Overall, therefore, the general 
pattern of results observed in Day 1 was observed in Day 2 for both groups.
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Explicit Measures
Explicit measures administered immediately after the IRAP. The data from 
the explicit measures were subjected to the same statistical analyses as the data 
from Experiment 1. Similar to the previous experiment, participants expressed 
a greater liking for young compared with old people on semantic differential 
scales (Ms = 1.493 and –0.180; d = .98). A 2 × 2 mixed repeated measures ANOVA 
with explicit rating (old vs. young) as the repeated measure and exemplar 
(pro-old vs. pro-young) as the between-participants variable indicated that 
the preference for young over old was significant, F(1, 22) = 21.021, p = .0001, 
η
p
2 = .48. The main effect for exemplar was nonsignificant, as was the 
interaction effect (ps > .23). Unlike Experiment 1, participants reported slightly 
less favorable attitudes toward young compared with old people on the feeling 
thermometers (Ms = 66.67° and 70.83°; d = –.42), but the difference between 
these ratings was not significant (p = .1517). Once again, the main effect for 
exemplar was nonsignificant, as was the interaction effect (ps > .2289).
Explicit measures administered 24 h after exemplar exposure. The pattern 
of explicit data remained stable 24 h after encountering the exemplars on 
both semantic differential scales and feeling thermometers. Similar to 
Day 1, participants again reported more favorable attitudes toward young 
compared with old people on the semantic differentials (Ms = 1.492 and .334; 
d = .70), and this difference was significant, F(1, 21) = 10.971, p = .003, η
p
2 = .35. 
Consistent with Day 1, no other semantic differential effects were significant 
(ps > .47). Participants continued to report slightly more favorable attitudes 
toward old compared with young people on feeling thermometers on Day 2 
(Ms = 70.87° and 70.435°; d = –.03), but again this difference was not significant 
(p = .86). Consistent with Day 1, no other effects were significant for the 
thermometers (ps > .35). Overall, the general pattern of results observed in 
Day 1 was observed in Day 2. 
Relationship Between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
Difference scores for the IRAP, semantic differential, and feeling 
thermometer measures were calculated as per Experiment 1. No significant 
correlations were found between the explicit and implicit measures for either 
Day 1 or Day 2 (Day 1: IRAP and feeling thermometers, r = –0.086, p = .68; 
IRAP and semantic differentials, r = –0.006, p = .98: Day 2: IRAP and feeling 
thermometers, r = –0.266, p = .21; IRAP and semantic differentials, r = –.110, 
p = .61). Similarly, no significant correlations existed between the two explicit 
measures for ratings of either old or young people for either of the two days 
(Day 1: old people, r = –0.104, p = .62; young people, r = 0.263, p = .21: Day 2: 
old people, r = .315, p = .14; young people, r = .300, p =  .16).
Test–Retest Reliability 
Correlations revealed that participants’ responses on implicit measures 
and on feeling thermometers remained remarkably stable across the two 
experimental sessions: IRAP, r = .49, p = .0215; feeling thermometer, r = .688, 
p = .0012 (young people ratings), r = .804, p = .0002 (old people ratings). In 
contrast, the semantic differential measure did not remain as stable across 
sessions: r = .234, p = .27 (young people ratings), r = .266, p = .21 (old people 
ratings).
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Summary
Pro-young exemplar exposure produced an IRAP performance similar to 
that produced in Experiment 1 with no exemplar training. Although there was 
an overall reduction in response latencies on Day 2, suggestive of a practice 
effect, the pro-young group produced longer latencies for inconsistent, relative 
to consistent, trials on both days. In contrast, the pro-old exemplar condition 
produced the opposite pattern—a pro-old IRAP effect across both exposures. 
Additional analyses revealed that on Day 1 and Day 2, the pro-young exemplar 
condition produced a strong pro-young effect with a somewhat weaker anti-
old effect, with Day 2 showing some evidence of an increased bias against 
old people. In contrast, the pro-old exemplar condition produced a very weak 
pro-young effect but a relatively strong pro-old effect, with some reduction in 
the latter in Day 2. The explicit measures remained stable across the 2 days, 
with a significant pro-young effect for the semantic differentials regardless 
of exemplar condition; the feeling thermometer effects were nonsignificant. 
The correlations between implicit and explicit measures were all weak and 
nonsignificant. The test–retest reliability was positive and significant for 
the IRAP and feeling thermometers, but non–significant for the semantic 
differentials.
General Discussion
The results from the IRAP in Experiment 1 revealed a bias toward young 
people, and thus it performed in a way that was broadly similar to the IAT, 
in that a pro-young bias was observed in the absence of any programmed 
exemplar training (see Jelenec & Steffens, 2002; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 
2002; Rothermund & Wentura, 2001). In the second experiment, the pro-young 
exemplars produced an IRAP performance that was broadly similar, across 
both days, to that produced in Experiment 1 with no exemplar training (i.e., 
a pro-young bias). In contrast, the pro-old exemplar condition reversed the 
overall IRAP effect, with longer response latencies for inconsistent relative 
to consistent trials, although the difference was nonsignificant. Once again, 
therefore, the IRAP performed in a way that is broadly consistent with the IAT 
study reported by Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001).
The correlations between implicit and explicit measures for Experiment 2 
of the current study were all weak and nonsignificant. This finding is 
consistent with the Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) study. Furthermore, the 
test–retest reliability was positive and significant for the IRAP. A similar 
result was obtained for the feeling thermometers, but not for the semantic 
differentials (i.e., the positive correlation for the latter was nonsignificant). 
A direct comparison of the IRAP test–retest reliability with that of the IAT is 
not possible because the age-related experiment reported by Dasgupta and 
Greenwald involved a single exposure to the IAT.
Consistent with Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001), neither the pro-young nor 
the pro-old exemplars in the current study appeared to significantly affect 
the feeling thermometer measure for either exposure. Interestingly, Dasgupta 
and Greenwald reported an unexpected effect for pro-old exemplars on their 
semantic differential scales, in that this condition produced an explicit 
preference for old over young; the converse effect was not observed for the 
pro-young condition, which produced no preference. In the current study, 
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however, a significant preference for young over old was observed in both 
exemplar conditions. A likely explanation for this difference across the two 
studies is the fact that the terms employed by Dasgupta and Greenwald for 
the semantic differentials were relatively extreme: ugly–beautiful, bad–good, 
unpleasant–pleasant, dishonest–honest, and awful–nice. In contrast, the following 
milder terms were employed in the current study: creative–stagnant, happy–
sad, brilliant–slow, energetic–tired, enthusiastic–weary, and productive–finished. 
The latter terms, therefore, may have been less prone to social desirability 
effects. For example, reporting that old people are tired or weary (as opposed 
to ugly or bad) might not be seen as particularly prejudiced or subject to 
social opprobrium. Consequently, the current pro-old exemplars may have 
had a minimal impact on the semantic differentials because participants did 
not consider their negative responses to old people as particularly negative. 
It is also important to note that in the current study, the same target terms 
were used for both the explicit and implicit measures, whereas Dasgupta 
and Greenwald employed different terms across the two sets of measures. 
Consequently, the explicit–implicit divergence observed in the current research 
provides a particularly powerful example of implicit cognition. 
The current results indicate that attitudes measured using a latency-
based procedure may diverge from the results of explicit measures and that 
the former appear to be more malleable than the latter. Furthermore, the IRAP 
indicates that the effect of pro-old exemplar training differentially affected 
implicit attitudes to young and old by weakening the pro-young and reversing 
the anti-old bias.4  The fact that the pro-old exemplar condition produced 
these two separate effects indicates that the IRAP, in contrast to the IAT, does 
indeed permit the assessment of attitudes toward individual concepts. More 
specifically, the reversal in the overall IRAP effect for the pro-old condition 
in Experiment 2 indicated not the establishment of an anti-young bias, but 
a reversal in the anti-old effect. As explained in the Introduction, the IAT 
cannot provide this level of analytic detail for individual concepts, and thus 
it is not possible to determine if the pro-old exemplars had a similar effect 
in the Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) study. Indeed, the same interpretive 
problem could apply to any study of malleability that employs the IAT as 
an implicit measure, because the effects on the individual categories are 
inseparable (cf. Blair, 2002). At the very least, therefore, the current findings 
indicate that the IRAP could provide a possibly useful alternative to the IAT 
when a fine-grained analysis of implicit cognition is required.
The Relational Elaboration and Coherence Model: A Relational  
Frame Theory Explanation for the Divergence Between Implicit  
and Explicit Measures 
In the Introduction, we predicted that the IRAP effect, similar to the IAT, 
would prove sensitive to the pro-old exemplar exposure, and this appeared 
4 The differential impact observed in Experiment 2 may be explained as follows. The 
participants were all relatively young university students, and recent IRAP research indicates 
that this group has high levels of implicit self-esteem (Vahey, et al., in press). Furthermore, in-
group favoritism and self-esteem are positively correlated (Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999). 
Perhaps, therefore, the anti-young exemplars, which targeted the participants’ in-group, had a 
lesser impact than the pro-old exemplars, which targeted an out-group (i.e., the exemplar effect 
on the in-group was attenuated by high self-esteem).
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to be the case. Interestingly, however, the explicit measures appeared to 
be unaffected. To explain this divergence in the two measures from the 
perspective of RFT, we offer below what we call the Relational Elaboration 
and Coherence (REC) model (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 
in press).
The REC model assumes that specific IRAP trials may produce an 
immediate and relatively brief relational response before the participant 
actually presses a response key. By definition, the most probable immediate 
response will be emitted first most often, and thus any IRAP trial that 
requires a key press that coordinates with that immediate response will be 
emitted relatively quickly; if, however, an IRAP trial requires a key press 
that opposes the immediate relational response, then it may be emitted less 
quickly. Critically, the REC model assumes that the probability of the initial 
response on the IRAP will often be determined by the verbal and nonverbal 
history of the participant and current contextual variables. Thus, participants 
in Experiment 1 produced IRAP performances that appeared to reflect 
exposure to pre-experimental verbal and nonverbal behavioral contingencies 
(i.e., responding more quickly to Young-Positive and Old-Negative stimulus 
relations, but more slowly to their reversed counterparts). When participants 
were first exposed to repeated examples of negative young people and positive 
old people, however, this appeared to establish the IRAP, and the experimental 
setting more generally, as contexts that increased the probability of atypical 
immediate relational responding. 
In attempting to explain why the exemplars did not have an impact on the 
explicit measures, the REC model assumes that responses to these measures 
likely reflected relatively elaborate and coherent relational responding. In 
other words, when asked to express an attitude or belief on a particular issue, 
it is likely that a person will produce a relational response that coheres with 
one or more other relational responses in his or her behavioral repertoire 
(see Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, & Dymond, 2001). Imagine, for example, that a 
participant indicated that “old people are tired” on a semantic differential. 
This simple relational response would likely cohere with other relevant 
relational networks, such as “My grandma falls asleep in her chair when we 
visit,” and “The old man next door can’t walk far without taking a rest.” The 
critical point here is that explicit measures typically are not completed under 
high time pressure, and thus participants have sufficient time to engage in 
the extended relational responding that is needed to produce a response that 
coheres with one or more other relational responses. When exposed to the 
IRAP, however, the impact of a participant’s elaborated relational responding 
would be absent or much reduced because there is insufficient time, on a 
trial-by-trial basis, to engage in the additional and sometimes complex 
relational activity that serves to generate a relationally coherent response.
In summary, therefore, the REC model assumes that the IRAP effect is 
largely driven by immediate and relatively brief relational responses, whereas 
explicit measures reflect extended and coherent relational networks. Or, 
more informally, the IRAP captures spontaneous and automatic evaluations, 
whereas explicit measures capture more carefully considered reactions. 
The core of the REC model explanation for the divergence between the two 
measures in the current study rests on the following two assumptions. First, 
immediate or automatic evaluative responses may or may not cohere with 
subsequent relational responding; when they cohere, implicit and explicit 
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measures will typically converge, but when they do not, the measures will 
typically diverge. In other words, it is assumed that participants typically 
“reject” their immediate and brief relational responses (or automatic 
evaluations) if they do not cohere with their more elaborate and extended 
relational responding. Second, the REC model assumes that simple repeated 
stimulus exposures, such as the exemplar training employed in the current 
study, would impact largely on immediate relational responding but less so 
on extended and coherent relational networks. Thus, the pro-old exemplars in 
the current study may have served to evoke old-positive immediate relational 
responses on the IRAP, but these were subsequently “rejected” when the 
explicit measures were completed because they did not cohere with elaborated 
relational responding. More informally, when asked to rate old people in terms 
of tired-versus-energetic, some of the old-positive exemplars may well have 
come to mind, but these were rejected as the basis for a rating because they 
were deemed atypical (e.g., “Einstein was brilliant, but most old people are 
still less energetic than most young people I know”). 
Admittedly, the REC model explanation for the divergence between 
explicit and implicit measures is highly speculative at the current time.5  
Nevertheless, it does appear to provide a possibly useful account that may 
be subjected to experimental analysis in future studies. For example, the 
REC model would predict that the divergence between implicit and explicit 
“socially sensitive” attitudes should increase with greater time pressure 
on the IRAP (because participants have less time to engage in elaborated 
relational responding). In any case, the current findings have shown that 
implicit attitudes, measured with an IRAP, appear to be more sensitive than 
explicit attitudes to relevant exemplars. Only future research will determine 
if the REC model, or an alternative account, will fully explain these and 
related findings. 
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Appendix
Old and Young Exemplars Used in Experiment 2 
Name True Description False Description
Admired Old Exemplars
Ronnie 
Drew
Irish singer and folk musician 
who co-founded the 
‘Dubliners’. 
Former paediatrician famous 
for his books on child rearing. 
Albert 
Einstein
World-famous physicist who 
won the Nobel Prize. 
World-famous psychic helped 
FBI solve cases. 
Mother 
Teresa
Was a true champion of the 
poor and destitute. Famous novelist and poet. 
Mary 
Robinson
Was the first female President 
of Ireland and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. 
A popular chat show host on 
RTE Radio 1, who co-presented 
with Derek Davis. 
Jack 
Charlton
Managed the Republic of 
Ireland Football Team and took 
them to the World Cup in 1990. 
Performance artist and poet. 
Designed the ‘Spike’ in Dublin’s 
O’Connell Street. 
Maureen 
Potter
Acclaimed Irish comedienne 
and actress. 
Horticulturalist famous for her 
programme ‘Gardener’s World’. 
Frank 
Sinatra
One of the most influential 
singers of the 20th century. 
Irish actor who played St. 
Francis of Assisi in a Gate 
theatre production. 
Angela 
Lansbury
Famous Hollywood actress 
who starred in “Miss Marple,” 
“Murder on the Orient Express” 
and “Murder She Wrote.” 
Mother of Robbie Williams who 
is famous for her charity work 
in the UK. 
Maureen 
O’Hara
Irish American film actress 
awarded ‘the Lifetime 
Achievement Award’ by the 
Irish Film & Television Academy 
in 2004. 
Founder of the Irish Country 
Woman’s Association and 
winner of the Calor Kosangas 
‘House Wife the Year’ 
competition in 1988. 
Gay Byrne
Presented the ‘Late Late Show’ 
— the world’s longest running 
chat show.
Prize-winning journalist for the 
Irish Times newspaper.
continues next page
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Old and Young Exemplars Used in Experiment 2 
Name True Description False Description
Disliked Old Exemplars
Fr. Brendan 
Smyth
Irish paedophile priest jailed 
after pleading guilty to 74 
cases of child abuse. 
Had multiple adulterous affairs 
with Irish housewives between 
1976 and 1988. 
Pol Pot
Cambodian leader who killed 
two million people through 
mass execution. 
Former Viet-Cong Colonel tried 
for war crimes. 
Harold 
Shipman
The world’s most prolific serial 
killer. 
Hit and run driver who mowed 
down a young mother and 
baby. 
Charles 
Haughey
Ex-Taoiseach who corruptly 
used taxpayers’ money for his 
own ends. 
Paedophile farmer from 
Wicklow currently in hiding in 
South America. 
Margaret 
Thatcher 
Former UK Prime Minister 
whose policies caused 
widespread unemployment and 
dissent. 
Wife of Romanian dictator 
found guilty of crimes against 
humanity. 
Myra 
Hindley
Known as ‘The Moors 
Murderess’. She received two 
life sentences for the rape, 
torture, and murder of 5 
children. 
Gun-runner for the IRA who 
was shot dead in Guilford in 
1978. 
Catherine 
Nevin
Found guilty of murdering her 
husband. 
Mother in Galway who drowned 
both of her children. 
Jane  
O’Brien
County Wexford woman who 
shot her nephew in order to 
get possession of a farm. 
Imprisoned for murdering 
and dismembering one of her 
brothers in County Cork. 
Imelda 
Marcos
Wife of former Philippine 
President, who stole between 
5 and 10 billion dollars of 
taxpayers’ money to fund her 
shopping sprees. 
Infamous brothel owner who 
held 30 girls against their will 
in Cork’s inner city. 
John 
Gilligan
Irish criminal implicated in the 
murder of journalist Veronica 
Guerin. 
Day-care worker accused of 
neglecting children at his day-
care centre. 
continues next page
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Old and Young Exemplars Used in Experiment 2 
Name True Description False Description
Admired Young Exemplars
Reneé 
Zellweger
Academy Award-winning movie 
actress who famously starred 
in ‘Bridget Jones’s Diary’ in 
2001. 
Winner of three gold medals 
for running in the 2004 Athens 
Olympics. 
Jodie Foster Famous actress. Famous novelist. 
Dermot 
O’Leary
Presenter of ‘Big Brother’s 
Little Brother’. 
Captain of the British Lions tour 
to New Zealand in 2005. 
Beyoncé 
Knowles
American R&B solo singer and 
lead singer of ‘Destiny’s Child’ 
crowned ‘Princess of Pop’ in 
2004. 
Famous ‘Bond Girl’ and four-
time Academy Award nominee 
for ‘Best Actress’. 
Damien 
Duff Irish international mid-fielder. Wexford hurling champion. 
Robbie 
Williams
British Pop singer and former 
member of ‘Take That’.
Irish international soccer 
goalkeeper. 
Samantha 
Mumba Famous Irish Pop singer. Rose of Tralee 2004. 
David 
Beckham
English footballer who plays 
for Real Madrid and captains 
the English National team. 
Celebrity hair-stylist and owner 
of the Toni & Guy chain of hair 
salons. 
Craig Doyle Irish television presenter. Irish male model.
Nadine 
Coyle
Northern Irish singer and 
member of pop group ‘Girls 
Aloud’. 
Professional Golfer who won 
the ‘Ladies Irish Open’ in 2002 
and 2004. 
continues next page
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Old and Young Exemplars Used in Experiment 2 
Name True Description False Description
Disliked Young Exemplars
Timothy 
McVeigh
The ‘Oklahoma City Bomber’. 
He killed 168 people and 
injured 500 after bombing 
the Oklahoma City federal 
building. 
School caretaker who stole 
thousands from the school 
where he worked. 
Pete 
Doherty
Irish ex-frontman of ‘The 
Libertines’ and drug-addicted 
boyfriend of Kate Moss. 
Olympic skater accused 
of plotting to injure his 
competitor. 
Louise 
Woodward
Nanny who was convicted of 
child murder. Convicted for dealing drugs. 
Malcolm 
McArthur
Double murderer from County 
Meath, currently serving the 
second longest ever life term 
in Irish prisons for brutally 
killing young victims. 
Irish intensive care nurse 
sentenced to 17 years for 
murdering six patients whom 
he claimed begged him to help 
them die. 
Marie 
Murray
Sentenced to life imprisonment 
in 1976 for shooting a 
policeman in an armed bank 
raid in Northern Ireland. 
Famously kidnapped a dentist 
and having removed his 
fingers, sent them to his wife. 
Rebecca 
Loos
Former personal assistant to 
David Beckham who allegedly 
had an adulterous relationship 
with him. 
Former charity worker found 
guilty of embezzlement and 
now serving 6 years in prison. 
Michelle  
De Bruin
Olympic medallist banned 
from future competition after a 
urine sample was found to be 
contaminated. 
Murderer who killed fashion 
designer Gianni Versace. 
Martin  
Nash
Confessed to the Grangegorman 
cannibal murders. 
Irish drug baron serving 18 
years in Mountjoy. 
Maxine  
Carr
Convicted for perverting the 
course of justice and providing 
a false alibi for the Soham 
murderer. 
Bombed the federal building 
in Oklahoma City, killing 
hundreds. 
Jeffrey 
Dahmer
Serial killer who cannibalized 
his victims. 
Bombed the World Trade Center 
in New York City.
